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1 Introduction 
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) was established to address the 
threat of climate change. The increased concentration of greenhouse gases is expected 
to cause significant changes in temperature, weather conditions, sea level, glaciers, etc. 
According to research, the Earth’s mean surface temperature is predicted to increase 
during the next 100 years by 1.4-5.8°C, which is a faster warming rate than in 10 000 
years (IPCC 2001). With the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, 37 countries made a 
binding commitment to emission reductions. The European Union agreed to reduce its 
emissions by 8% from the 1990 level during 2008-2012. This target was divided among 
member countries by the burden sharing agreement. The Emissions Trading Scheme is 
the main instrument of the European Union to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. 
  
The European Union relies on emissions trading because it ensures a predetermined 
total level of emissions and it also offers flexibility to companies in attaining their 
obligations, as they can choose whether to reduce emissions or buy emission allowances 
from other companies (European Commission 2000, 8). The advantage of emissions 
trading in relation to other instruments is its cost-efficiency; emissions are reduced 
where it is economically reasonable. The political process of constructing and 
implementing the scheme’s framework was remarkably fast. The emissions trading 
directive came into force only three years after the Commissions initiative. The 
intention was to establish the ETS quickly to gain experience of emissions trading 
before the Kyoto period 2008-2012 and wider international trade. 
 
The ETS came into force on 1 January 2005. It covers about 12 000 installations from 
energy, iron, steel, mineral and forest sectors, which produce 46% of carbon dioxide 
emissions in the European Union. The first year and a half of the newfound market have 
been promising. In 2005, about 322 million European Union emission allowances 
(EUAs) were traded, the turnover being 14.6%. The average price in 2005 was about 
20€, but volatility has been high. The most active market participants are large power 
companies, banks and investment funds. (Capoor & Ambrosi 2006, 14.) The market has 
been disturbed by uncertainty regarding future regulation and some technical issues 
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such as problems with allowance registries. Overall, companies and authorities have 
learned a lot about emissions trading and the maturing of the market is in process. 
 
An essential character of a mature and well functioning market is informational 
efficiency. Informational efficiency means that market prices reflect all relevant 
information and that market participants have a good understanding of price formation. 
In an informationally efficient market, it is impossible to predict future prices and 
therefore it is also impossible for anyone to constantly beat the market and earn above 
average returns. Prices react fast to new randomly arriving information and, 
consequently, the price process itself is random. There is no gradual, predictable 
adaptation to a new level. (Fama 1970, 383; Malkiel 2003, 59.) The sufficient 
conditions of informational efficiency are inexistent transaction costs, free information 
and common agreement on the implications of information (Fama 1970, 387).  
 
In the real world, markets are never perfectly efficient. Therefore, the informational 
efficiency hypothesis is defined in three different forms (Campbell et al. 1997, 22). 
According to a relaxed form of the informational efficiency hypothesis, market prices 
reflect all information contained in historical prices. Consequently, informationally 
efficient prices should follow a random walk, which is a process where observations are 
the sum of the preceding observation and a random increment. There econometric 
requirements for the increments vary depending on the strength of the random walk 
hypothesis. This thesis focuses on the weakest form, the so-called RW3 model. It allows 
increments to be dependently distributed, but denies serial autocorrelation. Campbell et 
al. (1997, 33-55) provide an extensive presentation of the random walk hypothesis and 
random walk tests, including RW3 tests. The RW3 is most often tested in empirical 
economic studies. 
 
This thesis studies informational efficiency of the newfound European Union emission 
allowance market. The issue raises specifically the following questions: 
 
• Is the EUA price reacting fast to new information? 
• Do market participants have a clear picture of price formation? 
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• Is it possible to predict the EUA price? 
• Is there a possibility to make extra profits in the EUA market? 
 
The main research problem is if the EUA price process is a random walk. The research 
method is an econometric analysis. The econometric tests carried out in this study are: 
 
• unit root test 
• autocorrelation coefficient analysis 
• variance ratio test 
• predictability test with an autoregressive model 
 
The unit root test is used to check whether the EUA price process is stationary or has a 
stochastic trend. The autocorrelation coefficient analysis and variance ratio test reveal if 
the price series is a random walk. In the case of a random walk, the autocorrelation 
coefficients are zero and the variance of the series grows linearly with time. The degree 
of predictability is studied with an autoregressive model. The predictability test was 
added after the EUA price series proved autocorrelated. In the case of a non-random 
walk price process, the market may still be regarded as informationally efficient, 
provided that the price in unpredictable to a sufficient degree. 
 
The analyzed EUA price series is the daily closing price of a futures contract expiring in 
December 2006, from the European Climate Exchange (ECX). The price is examined 
during the period 22.4.2005 - 30.3.2006, forming 240 observations. ECX is the most 
liquid of exchanges providing a platform for about 90% of all trades carried out in 
exchanges (GSN 2005, 2). The vintage 2006 was chosen because it constitutes the 
longest time series and it is the most liquid contract in 2006. 
 
The results show that the econometric conditions for a random walk are not completely 
fulfilled in the EUA case, for there is correlation between the observations. The 
variance, on the other hand, does grow exactly linearly with time. The autoregressive 
model was constructed to find out if serial correlation could be used to predict future 
prices. The results report that the EUA price series is in practice unpredictable, the R-
squared being extremely low: about 6,3%. In the light of these results, it can be stated 
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that, from an econometric point of view, the requirements of informational efficiency 
are not fulfilled. However, from an economic point of view, the European Union 
emission allowance market is informationally efficient to a great extent because the 
price process is unpredictable and extra profits seem impossible. 
 
Similar studies on informational efficiency of different markets have been carried out 
(see Fama (1991, 1577-1581) for a review of studies). The closest reference is the 
research of Albrecht et al. (2005) on informational efficiency of the United States 
sulphur dioxide (SO2) permit market. The findings of Albrecht et al. indicate that 
although the SO2 permit price process is not a random walk, it is sufficiently 
unpredictable, and therefore the SO2 market seems to be informationally efficient. The 
SO2 permit market, concerning the emissions of over 3200 fossil-fuelled electric plants, 
has served as an example for the development of the ETS (Christiansen et al. 2005, 16). 
 
The structure of this thesis is as follows. In chapter 2, I introduce international climate 
policy and the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. In chapter 3, I present the 
theoretical framework of this study, which includes the portfolio theory, the 
informational efficiency hypothesis, and the random walk hypothesis. The portfolio 
theory defines the asset pricing principles that constitute the foundation of informational 
efficiency theory. Random walk hypothesis, on the other hand, determines the 
conditions of the price process in informationally efficient markets. The EUA markets 
and the price data are described in chapter 4. Chapter 5 includes a presentation of the 
econometric analyses. I discuss the results and conclude in chapter 7. 
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2 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
In this chapter, I introduce international climate policy aiming at combating climate 
change. I also present the European Union’s emissions trading directive, which defines 
the goals, measures and arrangements of the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme. 
 
2.1 International climate policy 
 
According to latest scientific research, our climate is being severely affected by human 
activities. The concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are rising 
explosively and they are now higher than they have been in 650 000 years (Siegenthaler 
et al. 2005). The global mean temperature has increased about 0.6% during the 20th 
century (IPCC 2001, 4). The latter half of the century has been warmer in the Northern 
Hemisphere than in 1200 years (Osborn & Briffa 2006). Changes have also appeared in 
sea level, snow cover, permafrost, glaciers, growing season as well as plant and animal 
ranges. Extreme weather conditions have become more common. During the next 100 
years, the mean temperature is predicted to increase by 1.4-5.8°C, which is a faster 
warming rate than in 10 000 years. The sea level is expected to rise 0.09-0.88m between 
years 1990 and 2100. The indirect effects of climate change are increase in diseases, 
extinction of species, decrease in biodiversity, changes in cereal crops, increase in pests, 
etc. Socio-economic effects of climate change are difficult to forecast, but they are 
bound to be serious. Especially poor people in developing countries will be exposed to 
the threats. (IPCC 2001, 4-12.) 
 
The international community awoke to realise the human impact on our climate by the 
early 1990’s. One of the most important impulses was the publication of the first 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) scientific report in 1990 (IPCC, 
1990a, 1990b, 1990c), which started to reveal the seriousness of climate change. The 
IPCC had been established two years earlier by United Nations Environmental Program 
(UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO). Since the first report, 
IPCC has adopted a significant role in presenting the scientific background of climate 
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change, its impacts, and possible measures for adaptation and mitigation. The fourth 
assessment report will be published in 2007. 
 
The international community responded to the unveiling threat of climate change in 
1990 by forming the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC), which a year 
later adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
(INC 1992). The UNFCCC is a treaty signed by 189 countries, aiming to reduce the 
atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and to prevent dangerous climatic 
effects of these gases. It came into force in March 1994, and is presently approved by 
188 countries. The Convention defines the objectives and principles of the member 
countries, the Parties. The most essential of these are acting in climate change 
mitigation, developing new technology, providing carbon sinks, adapting to climate 
change, and promoting research, information exchange, and education. The Parties form 
three groups, the so-called Annex I, Annex II and non-Annex I Parties. Annex I Parties 
include industrialized countries that were members of the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1992 and economies in transition. Annex II 
Parties are only the OECD members. The Annex II and all other Parties are included in 
the Non-Annex I Parties. All Parties are obliged to monitor their greenhouse gas 
emissions and report their actions against climate change. The Annex I countries are 
required to adopt climate change policies in order to reduce GHG emissions. The 
OECD members must also assist developing countries in combating climate change by 
providing financial resources and by promoting technological development. The 
representatives of all Parties meet annually at a Conference of the Parties (COP), where 
all decisions regarding the Convention are made. (UNFCCC 2003, 3-6.) 
 
In the COP3 conference in Kyoto in 1997, the Parties adopted the Kyoto Protocol 
(UNFCCC 1998). The adoptation of the Protocol was great progsress, as it defined 
concrete, legally binding commitments for industrialized countries to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions. The goals may be attained by limiting GHG emissions or by enhancing 
carbon sinks in forestry and land-use under certain conditions. The Annex I Parties are 
to cut their emissions by 5% of the base year 1990 during the Kyoto Protocol’s first 
commitment period 2008-2012. The European Union has a common commitment to an 
8% reduction of emissions, which is shared by the EU15 member states. The country-
specific reduction targets and share of total CO2 emissions in 1990 are presented in 
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Table 1. It can be seen that the world’s largest emitters are United States with 36.1% of 
emissions in 1990, the EU 24.2%, Russia 17.4%, Japan 8.5%, Canada 3.3% and 
Australia 2.1%. The most significant polluters in the EU are Germany, UK, Italy, 
France and Spain. The tightest reduction commitments are made by Denmark, Germany 
and Luxembourg. Most countries have a goal of 6-8% reductions. Finland, France, New 
Zealand, Russia and Ukraine have to stay at the 1990 level, whereas Portugal, Greece, 
Spain, Ireland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden can increase their emissions. (UNFCCC 
2003, 15.) 
 
 
Table 1. CO2 emission reduction targets of the Kyoto Protocol as a percentage of base 
year 1990 and share of the total by country (UNFCCC 2003, 15). 
Annex I 
Party 
Limit 
from ‘90 
Share of 
emissions 
Member of 
the EU 
Limit 
from ‘90 
Share of 
emissions 
Australia* 108% 2.1% Austria 87% 0.4% 
Bulgaria 92% 0.6% Belgium 92.5% 0.8% 
Canada 94% 3.3% Denmark 79% 0.4% 
Croatia 95% - Germany 79% 7.4% 
Czech Rep. 92% 1.2% Greece 125% 0.6% 
Estonia 92% 0.3% Finland 100% 0.4% 
EU-15 92% 24.2% France 100% 2.7% 
Hungary 94% 0.5% Ireland 113% 0.2% 
Iceland 110% 0.0% Italy 93.5% 3.1% 
Japan 94% 8.5% Luxembourg 72% 0.1% 
Latvia 92% 0.2% Netherlands 94% 1.2% 
Lithuania 92% 0.0% Portugal 127% 0.3% 
New Zealand 100% 0.2% Spain 115% 1.9% 
Norway 101% 0.3% Sweden 104% 0.4% 
Poland 94% 3.0% UK 87.5% 4.3% 
Romania 92% 1.2%    
Russian Fed. 100% 17.4%    
Slovakia 92% 0.4%    
Slovenia 92% -    
Switzerland 92% 0.3%    
Ukraine 100% -    
USA* 93% 36.1%    
*Countries did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol 
 
 
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol required that enough Parties to the 
Convention ratify it. This meant 55 Parties and enough Annex I Parties so that 55% of 
1990 CO2 emissions of all Annex I Parties are encompassed. The requirement turned 
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out to be tough because the big emitters USA and Russia were hesitating. After several 
years of political debate, the Kyoto Protocol finally entered into force in February 2005 
along with Russia’s ratification. Russia’s decision was reasonable, because its emissions 
have dropped from the 1990 level by 30% and it can profit of emission trading as a net 
seller. Russia will also profit from the JI projects. (European Commission 2004). The 
United States and Australia opted out of the contract. If it were not for the activity of the 
European Union, the Kyoto Protocol would not have come into force after the change of 
course of the US (Michaelowa & Butzengeiger 2005, 1). 
 
The Kyoto Protocol includes mechanisms to increase flexibility in the attainment of 
GHG emission reductions. They were originally proposed by the US and opposed by 
the EU (Michaelowa & Butzengeiger 2005, 2). The mechanisms are joint 
implementation (JI), the clean development mechanism (CDM) and international 
emissions trading. The former two allow industrialized countries to implement projects 
in economies in transition and developing countries respectively, and thus reduce their 
greenhouse gas emissions with lower costs. The resulting emission reductions are called 
emission reduction units (ERU) from JI projects and certified emission reductions (CER) 
from CDM projects. (UNFCCC 2003, 19-22.) 
 
The future goal in climate policy is to construct a worldwide greenhouse gas market. In 
addition to the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme, there are already similar 
but smaller mandatory systems in New South Wales, Oregon and Norway. The Chicago 
Climate Exchange is a voluntary market place. Canada, Japan, and Switzerland are 
planning emissions trading projects. (Lecocq & Capoor 2005, 32-35; Nicholls 2005, 20.) 
The trade of CERs and ERUs already forms an international market. The most active 
buyers have been Japan, Netherlands and the UK. (Capoor & Ambrosi 2006, 25.) 
 
Since the United States refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, international climate policy 
has been in a confusing situation. The latest political turn is the formation of the Asia-
Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate (APP) by the United States, 
Australia, Japan, India, China and South Korea in January 2006. It is a voluntary 
framework to address climate, development, energy and environmental issues in 
particular with technological improvement and transfer. (APP 2006.) Canada is most 
likely joining the Partnership (Point Carbon 22.5.2006). In addition, the Asian countries 
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China, India, Indonesia, Korea and Vietnam are still not showing interest in binding 
emission constraints (Point Carbon 5.5.2006). Upon these grounds, it is difficult to 
agree on the extension of the Kyoto Protocol, but negotiations are continuing. A 
working group aiming to prepare negotiations of future climate policy met for the first 
time in May 2006 in Bonn. Its objective is to form a follow-up for the Kyoto period 
2008-2012 without a gap. (UNFCCC 2006b.) 
 
 
2.2 The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
 
The intention of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is the 
advancement of greenhouse gas emission reductions and the achievement of member 
countries’ Kyoto targets in the most effective and advantageous way. Emissions trading 
has been considered as the best instrument because it ensures a predetermined emission 
cap and offers flexibility and cost savings to companies in attaining their obligations. It 
also produces an emission price, which companies can take into account in their 
investments. The European Commission aimed to build the emissions trading system by 
2005 to gain experience before the Kyoto period and the beginning of wider 
international emissions trading in 2008. (European Commission 2000, 8, 10.) 
 
For this reason the ETS was created rapidly. In March 2000, the European Commission 
published the Green Paper on greenhouse gas emissions trading (European Commission 
2000) to invoke discussion about emissions trading. The debate focused on, whether the 
first period would be mandatory for companies; which sectors would be included; 
whether the targets would be relative or absolute; and whether the system would be 
based on a baseline-and-credit or a cap-and-trade approach (Watanabe & Robinson 
2005, 12). The competitive effects of emissions trading at national and EU level were 
also discussed. The goal of harmonized climate policy was challenging due to differing 
interests of member states and the requirement that the policy should not interfere with 
competition (Rodi 2005, 193). The framework for the ETS was established after a fast 
decision process. The emissions trading directive (Directive 2003/87/EC) came into 
force in October 2003. 
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The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme is a cap-and-trade system where an 
overall emission constraint is set and emission allowances are allocated to polluting 
installations according to historical or projected emissions. The emissions of an 
installation must equal the amount of allowances in its possession at the end of each 
year. This objective may be attained by limiting emissions, by trading allowances or 
both. The abatement and trade decisions are made based on profit maximization and 
they depend on the marginal abatement costs and the price of allowances. One European 
Union emission allowance (EUA) corresponds to one tonne of carbon dioxide. The 
emissions trading directive also concerns other greenhouse gases – methane, nitrous 
oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride – but at this 
point only CO2 emissions are regulated. The directive identifies a three-year period 
2005-2008 and a five-year Kyoto period 2008-2012. The subsequent periods are 
projected to last for five years. 
 
The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme covers about 12 000 installations of 
6000 companies in all 25 member states. The emissions of these installations total 46% 
of all CO2 emissions of the EU. The industries involved in the ETS are power 
production, iron and steel production and processing, the mineral industry and wood 
pulp, paper, and card industries. Transportation, chemical, and aluminium sectors were 
left out due to strong lobbying (Michaelowa & Butzengeiger 2005, 3). The possibility to 
include aviation has been studied by the aviation working group appointed by the 
European Commission, but no decisions have yet been made (Aviation working group 
2006). 
 
Each member state of the European Union is, according to the directive, obliged to 
impose a national allocation plan (NAP) that states the total amount of allowances and 
the allocation of the allowances between different installations for each period. The plan 
for the first period 2005-2007 was to be submitted to the European Commission by 31 
March 2004 and the second plan for the Kyoto period 2008-2012 was due on 30 June 
2006. The NAPs should be consistent with national climate policy and national Kyoto 
targets. Each member country can specify in its climate policy, how the burden of 
emission reductions is shared between the sectors included in the ETS and excluded 
from it. If the plan is not in accordance with the criteria, the Commission has the right to 
reject it. Due to strong industrial lobbying, the allowances are mostly given for free 
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instead of auctioning (Michaelova & Butzengeiger 2005, 1). In the first period 5% of 
the allowances and in the second period 10% of the allowances may be auctioned. In 
some regards, auctioning is more advantageous than free allocation, for example it 
removes the problem of windfall profits (Sijm et al. 2005, 88-92). 
 
The possibility to take advantage of the project-based mechanisms in the ETS was 
realized with the so-called linking directive (Directive 2004/101/EC) in October 2004. 
Member countries must declare in their national allocation plans how big a proportion 
of reductions may be achieved by buying CERs and ERUs. The idea is to ensure 
sufficient domestic action. The directive does not allow units from nuclear or carbon 
sink projects. CERs and ERUs have a significant advantage compared to EUAs as they 
can to be banked to the Kyoto period 2008-2012. 
 
Allowances are allocated to installations every year by 28 February. By 31 March the 
following year, installations must report to a national authority the previous year’s 
emissions, verified by an authorized verifier. By 30 April, each installation must 
surrender an amount of allowances equalling its emissions in the previous year to the 
national authority. If a company does not succeed in returning enough allowances, it has 
to attain the allowances later and pay a penalty of 40€/tonne of CO2 in the first period 
and 100€/tonne of CO2 in the second. The Commission publishes data concerning 
verified emissions and surrendered allowances on 15 May. Emission allowances are 
allowed to be transferred between different years, but not between periods. The 
surrendered allowances are cancelled by 30 June. (European Commission 2006, 2.) On 
the grounds of realized emissions, it is possible to draw conclusions about the strictness 
of the emission cap and companies’ abatement costs. Therefore, the publication of 
emission data may have a great influence on the market. 
 
Table 2 presents country-specific information on allowance allocation and verified 
emissions in 2005. The table contains the allocation of allowances in 2005-2007, the 
share of national allocation of the total amount of allowances, number of installations 
included with an active registry on 30 April 2006, the national allocations for 2005, and 
verified emissions of 2005. The national registries of Cyprus, Luxembourg, Malta and 
Poland are not yet active, which prevents all information of being available. The 
installations of Poland add up to 1166, and the installations of Cyprus, Luxembourg and 
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Malta to 34 (EU 2005). In addition, the emissions of 279 installations from other 
countries have not yet been reported (European Commission 2006, 4). The absence of 
information about emissions from these installations blurs the picture of total emissions. 
 
 
Table 2. National allocation plans of EU member states for 2005-2007, share of total 
allocation, number of installations covered with active registries, allocation for 2005, 
realized emissions 2005 reported by 4.6.2006, and excess allowances. Data is available 
only for members with active registries on 4.6.2006. (EU 2005; European Commission 
2006,4; CITL 2006.) 
EU member NAP I 
(Mt) 
Share Install. Allocation ’05 
(Mt) 
Emissions ‘05 
(Mt) 
Excess 
(Mt) 
Austria 99.0 1.5% 199 32.4 33.4 -1.0 
Belgium 188.8 2.9% 309 58.3 55.3 2.9 
Czech Rep. 292.8 4.4% 395 95.4 81.2 14.2 
Cyprus 17.0 0.3% - - - - 
Denmark 100.5 1.5% 381 37.3 26.5 10.8 
Estonia 56.9 0.9% 43 16.7 12.6 4.1 
Finland 136.5 2.1% 584 44.6 33.1 11.5 
France 469.5 7.1% 1086 150.4 131.3 19.1 
Germany 1497.0 22.8% 1846 494.9 473.8 21.0 
Greece 223.2 3.4% 140 71.0 71.2 -0.2 
Hungary 93.8 1.4% 231 30.1 25.9 4.2 
Ireland 67.0 1.0% 109 19.2 22.4 -3.2 
Italy 697.5 10.6% 948 213.9 223.1 -9.2 
Latvia 13.7 0.2% 93 4.1 2.9 1.2 
Lithuania 36.8 0.6% 93 13.5 6.6 6.9 
Luxembourg 10.07 0.2% - - - - 
Malta 8.8 0.1% - - - - 
Netherlands 285.9 4.3% 210 86.5 80.4 6.1 
Poland 717.3 10.9% - - - - 
Portugal 114.5 1.7% 243 36.9 36.4 0.5 
Slovak Rep. 91.5 1.4% 175 30.5 25.2 5.2 
Slovenia 26.3 0.4% 98 9.1 8.7 0.4 
Spain 523.3 8.0% 816 170.4 181.1 -10.7 
Sweden 68.7 1.1% 705 22.2 19.3 2.8 
UK 736 11.2% 770 206.0 242.4 -36.4 
TOTAL 6572.4 100% 9474 1843.3 1792.8 50.5 
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The total amount of allocated allowances for the first period 2005-2007 was about 6,6 
billion allowances, which makes nearly 2.2 billion allowances per year. The most 
significant countries with the largest share of total allocation are Germany (22.8%), the 
UK (11.2%), Poland (10.9%), Italy (10.6%), Spain (8.0%) and France (7.1%). Sector-
specifically, the power and heat industry is the biggest sector with 55% of the 
allowances.  Mineral and metal industry hold both about 12%, and oil and gas industries 
10% of allowances (Capoor & Ambrosi 2006, 13). 
 
The total allocation for the first ETS period was intentionally generous in order to give 
companies an opportunity to practice before the Kyoto period 2008-2012. The market 
was believed to be lacking about 180-270 million allowances during the period (Capoor 
& Ambrosi 2006, 16). The announcement of realized emissions during 2005 has 
revealed that the allocation was too generous. The emissions in 2005 of 9474 
installations with active registries on 4 June 2006 total 1792.8 Mt CO2. These 
installations were allocated 1843.3 M allowances. Hence, the installations have an 
excess of 50.5 M allowances. One must keep in mind, that this figure does not take 
account of emissions from all installations. It is estimated that Poland is in excess of 20-
30 M allowances (Carbon finance 2006, 2). In addition, countries have decided to 
divide the total allocation of the three-year period in a way that the allocation of 2005 
was “front-loaded” and about 13.8 M larger than the average annual allocation (CITL 
2006). 
 
According to Table 2, the allocation of 15 countries exceeded emissions. France and 
Germany had the most of excess allowances, both about 20 M. Czech Republic, 
Denmark, and Finland were over 10 M allowances long. Belgium, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovak Republic and Sweden were in excess of 2.8 to 6.9 M 
allowances each. Austria, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK were short of 
allowances. The most serious shortages were in Italy (9.2 M), Spain (10.7 M), and the 
UK (36.4 M). For the other countries, the allocation equalled the emissions more or less 
accurately. It is still possible that the first ETS period as a whole is short, especially if 
future energy demand and gas prices are high (Capoor & Ambrosi 2006, 17) .  
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The highest abatement potential in the European Emissions Trading Scheme, if CERs 
are not taken into account, is in the Central European countries. They are expected to 
increase their trade significantly, and during the year 2006 at least 30 million 
allowances are to be supplied from these countries (Point Carbon 23.12.2005, 3). This 
of course depends on the price level. Of short-term abatement possibilities, the switch 
from coal to gas is the most reasonable, because power and heating industry emit a large 
share of emissions and changing the fuel from coal to gas reduces about half of the 
emissions per unit (Christiansen et al. 2005, 27). 
 
The national allocation plans for the Kyoto period 2008-2012 were to be submitted by 
the end of June 2006, but several member countries missed the deadline. It remains to 
be seen, how tight the new restrictions will be. There are signs that suggest more rigid 
allocations, for example Sweden and Portugal have already decided on a tighter NAP. 
Germany is expected to reduce allocation significantly. To attain the Kyoto targets and 
ensure a strong price, the NAPs should be tight. (Point Carbon 9.6.2006.) The NAPs for 
the first period were badly delayed of the official submission date. The plans of Czech 
Republic, Greece, Italy and Poland were accepted long after the opening of the ETS. 
Hopefully, the NAPs for 2008-2012 will not be seriously delayed. 
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3 Theoretical framework 
 
The theory of informational efficiency determines the concept of an informationally 
efficient market. In an informationally efficient market, prices reflect all information 
immediately and price changes are unpredictable. There are no arbitrage opportunities 
and therefore extra profits are impossible. In addition, market participants have a clear 
understanding of price formation in an informationally efficient market. 
 
The informational efficiency theory is inseparable from the modern portfolio theory, 
introduced in the 1950’s by Harry Markowitz (1952). The modern portfolio theory and 
the capital asset pricing model define the principles of asset pricing. The main statement 
is that the return of an asset should correspond with its systematic risk, which is risk that 
cannot be diversified away in a portfolio. The efficient market hypothesis is dependent 
on an underlying asset-pricing model, because without one, the efficiency of asset 
pricing cannot be assessed. 
 
In a perfectly informationally efficient market, the unpredictable price process follows a 
random walk, in which the current value is the previous value plus a random increment. 
The econometric requirements of a random walk are determined by the random walk 
hypothesis. The random walk tests are a widely used method to empirically study the 
informational efficiency of financial markets. Even if some predictability exists, a 
market may still be considered efficient if the predictability cannot be used to constantly 
make revenue above average. 
 
This chapter presents the modern portfolio theory, the efficient markets hypothesis and 
the random walk hypothesis. The European Union emission allowance market will later, 
in chapter 5, be studied against this theoretical framework. 
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3.1 The modern portfolio theory 
 
Security risk and portfolio risk 
 
The total risk of an asset can be divided into systematic risk, also called market risk, and 
unsystematic risk, which is also called unique risk. Systematic risk is risk that correlates 
with the market portfolio and is affected e.g. by inflation, exchange rates and interest 
rates. Unsystematic risk is independent of market fluctuations. It is affected by the 
companies' individual characteristics. Unsystematic risk can be eliminated by portfolio 
diversification, because the variances due to companies’ individual characteristics offset 
each other. The standard deviation of the portfolio returns is reduced as the number of 
assets in the portfolio increases. After the diversification only the systematic risk 
present in the market is left. Because the unsystematic risk can be eliminated, only the 
systematic risk should affect asset pricing. (Knüpfer & Puttonen 2004, 121-123; Brealey 
et al. 2006, 160-161; Fabozzi et al. 2002, 241-251.) 
 
The systematic risk of an asset or a portfolio is often expressed with the variable beta, 
β . It describes the sensitivity of an asset to market fluctuations – in other words, how 
well it correlates with the market return. The beta of a stock, i, is: 
 
2
m
im
i
σ
σβ = ,      [3.1] 
 
where imσ  is the covariance between a stock’s return and the market return and 
2
mσ  the 
variance of the market return (Brealey et al. 2006, 167-170). The systematic risk of a 
portfolio, the portfolio beta, pβ , is: 
 
∑
=
=
N
i
iip X
1
ββ ,     [3.2] 
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where the portfolio beta is the average of individual betas weighted by the proportion of 
each security, iX . The systematic risk can constitute the total risk of a portfolio, if the 
unsystematic risk has been eliminated.  
 
The security return can be divided into two components in a same way as the risk. The 
systematic return correlated with the market return and the unsystematic return, which is 
independent of market fluctuations. The systematic return can be again expressed as 
beta and the unsystematic asε ′ . Now the security return, R, can be noted as: 
 
εβ ′+= mRR .      [3.3] 
 
The unsystematic return in a diversified portfolio is on average zero. Thus, the ε ′  can 
be expressed as the sum of α , which is the average value of unsystematic returns over 
time, and ε , which is the residual returns. The different components are presented in 
Figure 1, which pictures security returns (dots) as a function of market returns for single 
securities. The β  expresses the slope of the security returns. It shows how a change in 
market returns affects the security returns. The term α  is the average of the returns and 
ε  is the actual residual returns. The equation 3.3 can be reformed to the form of the so-
called market model: 
 
εβα ++= mRR      [3.4] 
 
(Fabozzi et al. 2002, 248-249.) 
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Figure 1. Model of security returns (Fabozzi et al. 2002, 249). 
 
 
Each individual security offers a different combination of expected return and risk. 
These combinations are presented in Figure 2 as diamonds. The securities down and to 
the left offer a moderate expected return at a small risk, measured as standard deviation 
of return. The security A, on the other hand, offers a great expected return, but the risks 
related to it are significant. By combining these securities, it is possible to obtain any 
point in the marked area, i.e. any combination of risk and return in this area. Of course, 
investors seek to maximize expected return and minimize risks, thus the points on the 
line at the top of the marked area are the best. Among all the possible sets of securities, 
there are portfolios that provide the highest return for each level of risk. These 
portfolios are called efficient portfolios and they form the efficient frontier. In Figure 2 
they are assets A, B, C, and D. It depends on the investor’s preferences, which one of 
the portfolios on the line he or she chooses. (Brealey et al. 2006, 185-186.) 
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Figure 2. Efficient portfolios (Brealey et al. 2006, 186). 
 
 
Capital asset pricing model 
 
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM), developed by William Sharpe (1964), is 
founded on the simple principle that securities with higher systematic risk should have 
higher expected returns and that returns should correlate with the level of systematic 
risk. The model defines the law of one price, which demonstrates that assets with the 
same level of risk should have identical expected returns. The underlying assumptions 
of the CAPM are strong: 1) investors are risk-averse, 2) the time-horizon is the same for 
all investors, 3) investors have the same expectations abut the future security risks and 
returns, and 4) the capital markets are perfect. (Fabozzi et al. 2002, 251-253.) 
 
The capital asset pricing model represents the expected return of a composite portfolio 
of two portfolios: a riskless portfolio, f, and a risky portfolio with the same risk as the 
market portfolio, m. The beta is zero for the riskless portfolio and 1 for the risky 
portfolio. The portfolio beta, pβ , is a weighted average of these. Thus pβ expresses the 
proportion of investment invested in the risky portfolio and 1- pβ  the proportion 
invested in the riskless portfolio. The expected return, ),( pRE  of the composite 
portfolio is a weighted average of the returns of the portfolios f and m: fR  and mR . 
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)()1()( mpfpp RERRE ⋅+⋅−= ββ ,    [3.5] 
 
which can be rewritten as: 
 
( )fmpfp RRERRE −+= )()( β . 
 
This equation is the CAPM. The interpretation is that an investor should be 
compensated for giving up consumption possibilities for a period of time and for being 
exposed to risk.  The relationship between the expected return and risk should be linear. 
Thus, expected return of a portfolio should exceed the riskless rate of return in 
proportion to the portfolio beta. (Fabozzi et al. 2002, 251-252.)  
 
The CAPM can be also expressed in terms of risk premiums. The risk premium is the 
expected rate of return minus the riskless rate of return. )( prE  is the expected portfolio 
risk premium and )( mrE  is the market risk premium. (Fabozzi et al. 2002, 251-253.) 
The CAPM states that the expected risk premium is equivalent to the quantity of risk 
and the market price of risk: 
 
)()( mpp rErE β= .     [3.6] 
 
(Fabozzi et al. 2002, 252-253.) 
 
The weakness of the CAPM is in its simplicity. The CAPM takes account of the price 
risk, but ignores many other essential risks. Extended models have been developed to 
overcome this problem. The multifactor CAPM includes a wider range of risks; the risk 
due to e.g. future labour income, future investment opportunities and future relative 
prices of consumer goods (Fabozzi et al. 2002, 255-256.) The arbitrage pricing theory 
(APT) model recognizes also other factors that affect the rate of return on a security in 
addition to the market index of the CAPM. The assumptions of the APT model are 
weaker than of the CAPM. (Fabozzi et al. 2002, 256-258.) 
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3.2 Informational efficiency 
 
In an informationally efficient market, security prices “fully reflect all available 
information” (Fama 1990, 1575). The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) states that 
security prices contain all available and relevant information, that is all information, 
expectations, and known risks. The price changes in an efficient market are random and 
unpredictable due to randomly arriving new information. As tomorrow’s news is not yet 
at hand and the information available today is already included in prices, it is impossible 
to predict tomorrow’s prices. It is therefore also impossible to make continuously extra 
profits that are above average in the market. If these opportunities occurred, they would 
quickly be eliminated by arbitrage. (Albrecht et al. 2005, 3.) 
 
In an efficient market, the prices need to respond fast to new information so that the 
information becomes immediately included. If the adjustment happens in steps, the 
price gives a false signal to the market participants until it reaches the correct level. The 
market participants in an efficient market have a good conception of price formation 
and of the market-clearing price. (Albrecht et al. 2005, 2; Fama 1970, 383.) 
 
The law of iterated expectations states the unpredictability of future stock prices 
(Campbell et al. 1997, 23). The law concerns the expectations of a random variable, X, 
conditional on the information sets tI  and tJ , which are respectively [ ]tIXE  and 
[ ]tJXE . The set tJ  is superior because it contains also the information of tI . 
According to the law: 
 
[ ] [ ][ ]ttt IJXEEIXE =           [3.7] 
 
The law implies that if only the information tI  is available, “the best forecast one can 
make of a random variable X is the forecast of the forecast one would make of X if one 
had superior information tJ ” (Campbell et al 1997, 23). In other words, the limited 
information set tI  cannot be used to predict the forecast error one would make if the 
information tJ  were at hand. This interpretation emerges from the more accessible form 
of the law of iterated expectations: 
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[ ][ ] 0=− tt IJXEXE           [3.8] 
 
The law of iterated expectations is useful in stock market analysis. It proves that the 
expected price change in stock markets is zero and that the best forecast of the next 
period price is the price today. Mathematically the expected price change is: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ][ ] 0**11 =−=− ++ VEVEEppE tttttt ,        [3.9] 
 
where tE  expresses the expectations at time t, pt the security price at time t, and *V  a 
“fundamental” value of the security price conditional on information tI  at time t. 
(Campbell et al. 1997, 23-24.) 
 
The efficient market hypothesis has very strict assumptions in its extreme form. The 
hypothesis assumes that information is costless to all market participants and trading 
costs are non-existent. In addition, all market participants agree on the implications of 
current information for the current price. The assumptions are not very plausible, 
because information and transaction costs exist in all real markets. Therefore, market 
efficiency must be evaluated after the transaction and information costs are accounted 
for. It should be noted, that these factors are only potential sources of market 
inefficiency and do not necessarily mean inefficiency if they occur in a market. (Fama 
1970, 387.) 
 
Since the real markets are not perfectly efficient, three levels of efficiency have been 
defined, based on the information that is reflected in prices. These forms are the strong, 
semistrong, and weak form, presented in Table 3. In the strong form, the prices reflect 
all possible information that can be obtained. This means that all market participants 
from professional investors and corporate managers to private investors are in the same 
position concerning information. The differences in revenues are determined only by 
random events. The semistrong form implies that prices reflect all public information, 
for example announcements of earnings, stock issuing, etc. In the last case, the weak 
form of market efficiency, prices are determined by all information contained in 
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historical prices. Thus, the requirement is that future prices cannot be predicted and it is 
impossible to continuously earn extra revenue. (Brealey et al. 2006, 337.) 
 
 
Table 3. Three forms of informational efficiency (based on Fama 1970, 383, 388; 
Brealey et al. 2006, 337).  
Form Definition Research problem 
Strong form 
Prices reflect all information 
known to anyone. 
Do some people have monopolistic 
access to information? 
Semistrong form 
Prices reflect publicly available 
information. 
How quickly do prices respond to 
public announcements? 
Weak form 
Prices reflect information 
contained in historical prices. 
Are future returns predictable? To 
what extent? 
 
 
Table 3 presents also the research problems associated to the three forms of market 
efficiency. The strong form can be tested by examining, if some market participants, e.g. 
professional investment managers, have private information to benefit from. The 
semistrong form is tested with the so-called event tests, which study the speed of 
adjustment of prices to new information. The weak form is tested by analysing the 
predictability of future returns. The tests are based on forecast power of historical time 
series, dividend yields, earnings and term-structure variables. The random walk tests, 
carried out in this thesis, are concluded in the weak form tests. The research of short 
time predictability has been dominant, but recent studies examine also long-term returns. 
Fama (1991) presents these tests and the main studies and results. 
 
Testing market efficiency is complex. What causes the most ambiguity is that efficiency 
can only be tested jointly with an equilibrium model, such as the capital asset pricing 
model, which defines the meaning of proper asset-pricing. This joint hypothesis 
problem implies that the test results rely ultimately on the asset-pricing model. In fact, 
market efficiency can never be totally rejected, because the joint model cannot be 
proven correct. Even if test results indicate inefficiency, it may be impossible to find out 
if the price behaviour is really due to market inefficiency or is it just that the 
equilibrium model is inaccurate. (Campbell 1997, 24-25; Fama 1991, 1576.) 
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In addition to the joint hypothesis problem, it is problematic that the conditions of 
market efficiency are practically never completely satisfied. Considering these facts, it 
may be more relevant to measure efficiency than to test its existence. The relative 
market efficiency in comparison to other markets can also be a fruitful research subject. 
(Campbell 1997, 24-25.) Fama (1991, 1576) argues that efficient market literature 
should not be judged on how precise results it produces, but on how it improves our 
knowledge of stock price behaviour. 
 
During the past decades, the research of market efficiency has revealed many strange 
things about the markets, which are inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis. 
Some of them can be explained by people’s irrational behaviour. For example, people 
have the tendency to irrational attitudes towards risk and false estimates of probabilities 
(Brealey et al 2006, 344-345). The discipline of behavioural finance has sprung to study 
these psychological aspects of market functioning. Malkiel (2003, 61) states, that 
markets sometimes make mistakes in pricing due to psychological factors, but in the 
long run “true value wins” and the anomalies disappear. 
 
 
3.3 Random walk hypothesis 
 
A random walk is a stochastic process, in which each value is the sum of the previous 
value and a random increment. The best forecast of tomorrow’s value of a variable is 
therefore its value today, since the random changes cannot be predicted. The conditional 
expectation of increments is zero, given the lags of the series. Thus, the historical values 
of a random walk time series are of no help in forecasting the future values. In the case 
of price series, the error term can be interpreted as the effect of today’s new information 
on today’s price. (Stock & Watson 2003, 458.) 
 
A random walk is a  nonstationary process, in other words, a stochastic trend. This 
results from the fact that the variance of a random walk increases over time and thus the 
distribution of the variable changes as time passes. The variance and conditional mean 
of the series are both linear in time. The random walk may have a drift, if it has a 
tendency to increase or decrease. In this case, the change of the variable is the stochastic 
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change plus a drift parameter. One should not be mistaken to interpret drift as 
predictability. (Stock & Watson 2003, 446; Campbell et al. 1997, 33.) 
 
Campbell et al. (1997, 31-55) define three versions of the random walk hypothesis, the 
RW1, RW2, and RW3 models, and present methods to test them. The models differ in 
the assumptions about the distribution of the increments. The RW1 is the strongest form 
and its increments are assumed to be independently and identically distributed1 (IID) 
with a mean 0 and variance 2σ . The RW1 is expressed as: 
 
ttt pp εµ ++= −1  ),0(~ 2σε IIDt       [3.10] 
 
where 1−tp  is the lagged value of pt, µ  is the possible expected price change or drift 
and tε  expresses the increments at time t. If the natural logarithm of the price series is 
used, the increments can be assumed to be normally distributed. As attractive as the 
RW1 is in its simplicity, it is a theoretical construct and not a realistic model for a long-
term asset price analysis. The probability distribution of stock returns cannot be stable 
for long periods, e.g. for decades. The RW1 can still be tested with various tests of IID, 
including the Cowles-Jones ratio and runs tests. 
 
The RW2 includes more general processes than the strict RW1. The increments of RW2 
are assumed independently but not identically distributed. The model allows for 
example unconditional heteroskedasticity in the increments, and therefore time-varying 
volatility. The unpredictability of increments still holds. Testing of independent but 
unidentical distribution is difficult. The main tests of RW2 hypothesis are filter rules 
and technical analysis. 
 
In the case of the most general form of random walk, RW3, both assumptions of RW1 
are relaxed. The increments are no longer independently and identically distributed. 
They are assumed dependent but uncorrelated. The model allows for example 
correlation of squared increments. The RW3 includes the RW1 and RW2 as special 
cases. The criteria of the three models are presented in Table 4. 
                                                 
1 Independently distributed implies that the value of a variable provides no information of the value of 
another variable. Identically distributed means that the variable has the same distribution. 
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Table 4. Random walk models and criteria (based on Campbell et al. 1997, 31-33). 
Model Increments are: 
 RW1 independently and identically distributed 
RW2 independently but not identically distributed 
RW3 dependent but uncorrelated 
 
 
The RW3 is the most often empirically tested hypothesis of random walk. The variety 
of RW3 tests include analysis of autocorrelation coefficients, Portmanteau tests, and the 
variance ratio test. The autocorrelation coefficients of the first difference series reveal 
serial correlation of the increments. Portmanteau statistics analyses the sum of squared 
autocorrelations. The Ljung-Box Q-statistic is a widely used test statistic, which detects 
nonzero autocorrelation. The variance ratio test is based on the fact that the variance of 
the random walk increments must be a linear function of time. In chapter 5, the 
European Union emission allowance price series is tested for fulfilling the criteria of a 
random walk RW3 with these three methods. The methods are described in more detail 
then. 
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4 Market review and price data description 
 
In this chapter, I present the European Union emission allowance (EUA) market and the 
price data used in the analysis in chapter 5. The market review includes a description of 
market characteristics, namely the price development, volatility, volumes, trading 
platforms, products and market participants. Informational efficiency of the EUA 
market is assessed through these characteristics. It is important to keep in mind the 
special features of the EUA market. The EUA market is an artificially formed 
environmental market intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The emission 
allowances are traded like any commodities, but the market conditions are defined by a 
regulatory framework. In particular, the national allocation plans and the links to the 
project-based mechanisms are crucial factors. The main market fundamentals are CO2 
production and the supply of credits from CDM projects. CO2 production depends 
especially on weather conditions, fuel prices, and economic growth. (Christiansen et al. 
2005, 20-28.) 
 
 
4.1 The European Union emission allowance market 
 
Price development 
 
Figure 3 presents the price development of European Union emission allowances (EUA) 
from the broker Spectron from 25 May 2004 to 26 May 2006. Broker data is chosen 
instead of exchange data, because brokers offer a longer range of price data. The data 
gives an accurate picture of the general price evolvement, although there are some 
minor differences among the EUA prices of different brokers and exchanges. Data from 
earlier dates is not available. The product in question is a forward2 of December 2005 
until its expiration date and since then the vintage 2006.  
                                                 
2 A forward contract is a legal agreement a to buy or sell an asset at a certain moment in the future for an 
agreed price called the delivery price, the exercise price or the forward price. Forwards are traded on the 
over-the-counter market. They usually do not have secondary markets, as standardized futures contracts 
do. 
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Figure 3. Price development of Spectron EUA forward 25.5.2004 - 26.5.2006 (source: 
Reuters 2006). 
 
 
The first emission allowances were traded in spring 2003. During the year 2003 the 
price increased from 6€ to 12€, but came down to about 7-8€ by May 2004 (Lecocq 
2004, 32). As can be seen from Figure 3, the price was fixed for several months to about 
7-9€ until the beginning of year 2005. After a small bend down, the price began its 
climb until it reached nearly 30€ in July 2005. This price development surprised most 
experts and market participants. According to Sijm et al. (2005, 19) the increase was 
largely due to political decisions on unpredictably strict national allocation plans, but 
the market reaction was to some extent exaggerated. Behind the price increase there 
were also high fuel prices, cold weather and the absence of suppliers in the market and 
uncertainty about the political environment (Lecocq & Capoor 2005, 33.) The price fell 
suddenly down at the end of June because of weaker UK gas price and the entrance of 
Czech Republic into the market (Point Carbon 22.7.2005, 2). The price fluctuated 
around 21-23€ for the rest of the year. 
 
At the beginning of year 2006 the price increased to way above 25 euros in consequence 
of cold weather and high fuel prices. For a couple of months the price stabilized, and 
then it reached the record of over 30€ in April driven by fuel prices. The publication of 
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carbon dioxide emission data of year 2005 at the end of April dropped the EUA price 
below half of its former value. During 24 April -3 May 2005, the price dropped from 
about 30.20€ to 11.45€. The Netherlands, Czech Republic, France and Spain reported 
that their emissions had been significantly below the 2005 allocations (Point Carbon 
28.4.2006, 2). Altogether, the EU member countries, excluding Poland, were about 50.5 
million tonnes in excess of emission allowances for 2005 (CITL 2006). After the drop, 
the EUA price has started to appreciate again. The reason for this is that some market 
participants are hedging against power price movements and some companies are not 
yet selling their surplus allowances. (Point Carbon 26.5.2006, 5-6.) 
 
To define how fast and accurate price changes have been, the price data should be 
examined thoroughly with event studies. For example, the effect of the publication of 
emission data is difficult to analyze at one glance because there was no single 
announcment. The data was to be published all at once on 15 May, but the data leaked 
into the market prematurely. The Netherlands and Czech Republic published their 
emission data on 24 April, Spain and France on 26 April. The rest was accidentally 
published on the Commission’s website on 12 May. (Carbon finance 2006, 1-2.) 
 
Exaggerations have also occurred. Especially in the beginning of 2005, market 
sentiments had an effect on the price. The markets overreacted to announcements 
concerning national allocation plans (Sijm et al. 2005, 19). Many traders see that the 
market exaggerated also the influence of year 2005 emissions and the price fell too low, 
especially as the surplus traders were not selling very eagerly (Point Carbon 28.4.2005, 
6). 
 
 
Volatility 
 
Volatility measures price fluctuations over a certain time period. It can be interpreted as 
price risk associated to a commodity. Mathematically, volatility is the standard 
deviation of logarithmic price returns, presented per year (see Appendix I).  Figure 4 
presents the annualized 30-day rolling volatilities of the Spectron EUA forward price 
from 25 May 2004 to 26 May 2006. The rolling volatility is calculated daily from prices 
of 30 previous days. It shows the development and fluctuations of volatility. It can be 
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seen that both extreme and reasonable volatility have occurred. The summer months of 
2004 saw high price fluctuations, but the autumn season was more stable. The spring 
and summer time in 2005 witnessed volatility of over 60% and even 80%, with a more 
stable short period in June. During the autumn, volatility has fluctuated about between 
20-45%. The turn of the year saw the volatility rising to over 40%, but then it started to 
decrease. In March 2006, volatility went under 20% for the first time after the beginning 
of ETS, only to bounce to huge figures as prices fell in April. The record-breaking 30-
day volatility is over 250%.  
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Figure 4. 30-day annualized rolling volatility of Spectron EUA price. Time range 
25.5.2004 -26.5.2006.  
 
 
Volatility of the EUA market has been high, due to regulatory and technical issues as 
well as fundamentals. Volatility shows if expected returns vary through time, but it is 
difficult to tell if the variation is rational (Fama 1991, 1586). Therefore, volatility 
cannot be used to make conclusions about a market’s informational efficiency, although 
it may indirectly be linked to it. 
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Volume 
 
Before the EU ETS officially entered into operation, some companies were already 
preparing for it by trading forward contracts. In 2003 about 30 trades took place, 
totalling 650 000 tonnes of CO2. In the following year 2004, volume increased up to 
about 9 million allowances. The year 2005 saw 322 million allowances traded, the 
turnover of allowances being 14,6%. The total value of the EUA market was US$8.2 
billion. During the first three months of 2006, 203 million allowances were traded. The 
total value of the market during these three months was US$6.6 billion. (Lecocq & 
Capoor 2005, 32; Capoor & Ambrosi 2006, 13-14.) 
 
The weekly volume of the over-the-counter (OTC) market and exchanges are presented 
in Figure 5. It can be seen that volume has been increasing quite steadily since spring 
2005. The turn of the year saw volume grow, but at the end of April 2006, the volumes 
exploded. The reason is partly in high volatility that occurred at the time. The Figure 5 
also shows that brokers handle a large part of trade, about 60-80% of all transactions, 
but the role of exchanges is also growing. In addition to brokers and exchanges, 
emission allowances are also traded bilaterally between companies. These trades are not 
taken into account in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Weekly volumes in the OTC market and exchanges during weeks from 
14/2005 to 14/2006.  (No data available of the distribution of trade between brokers 
and exchanges for the weeks 32/05, 34/05, 40/05, 15/06, and 16/06. Volumes for weeks 
15/06 and 16/06 were reported as one number, but are here divided in two.) (Point 
Carbon April 8 2005 – May 28 2006.) 
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Several factors have restricted volume. First, 25% of allowances were not in registries 
in 2005, in other words, they could not be traded. The possibility to transfer allowances 
to and from the following year has also decreased volume. Perhaps the most important 
reason is that many companies have decided to postpone trading, because they have 
wanted to wait and see how the market evolves or they do not have required knowledge 
of emissions trading. Uncertainty and the unfamiliar regulation have indeed affected 
market participants’ behaviour. (Capoor & Ambrosi 2006, 14-18). According to an 
enquiry (Laurikka & Ruokonen 2006, 7), many companies state that trade has been 
restricted by the immaturity of the market, the high volatility and the unknown effect of 
trading to the second phase national allocation plans. 
 
The growth of volume refers to market development. Market liquidity is important from 
the point of view of informational efficiency. The more liquid the market, the more 
there are ready buyers and sellers, and the less single trades affect the market price. 
Liquidity eases transactions and makes fast adaptation to new information possible. The 
exchange-traded futures contracts have more active secondary markets than broker-
traded forwards. Therefore, the growth of exchanges is positive in regard of 
informational efficiency. 
 
 
Trading platforms, products and market participants 
 
There are eight exchanges in the EUA market. These are European Climate Exchange 
(ECX), Nord Pool, Powernext, European Energy Exchange (EEX), Energy Exchange 
Austria (EXAA), Climex Alliance, Komodnita Burza Bratislava (KBB). The Climex 
Alliance is a union of the local exchanges New Values, SendeCO2, Amsterdam Power 
Exchange (APX), the APX Power UK, STX Energy Services, and euets.com. Table 5 
presents the exchanges along with their opening dates and products. The Nord Pool and 
ECX offer futures contracts3, whereas the others offer spot trade4. Nord Pool was the 
first one in the markets in February 2005, EEX followed in March and ECX in April. 
                                                 
3 A futures contract is is a promise to buy or sell a security at the maturity of the contract at an agreed 
price, the futures price. Futures are standardized, traded on exchanges and marked-to-market daily. 
4 Spot trade is cash trade for immediate delivery 
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Climex Alliance, Powernext and EXAA entered into operation at the end of June. The 
ECX is definetly the most liquid exchange, providing a platform for about 90% of all 
trades in exchanges (GSN 2005, 2). It also provides the largest variety of futures 
products. The ECX is planning to list EUA options5  in the autumn 2006 (Carbon 
finance 2006, 1). The second biggest exchange is Nord Pool with a 5 % share of trades 
(GSN 2005, 2). 
 
 
Table 5. EUA market exchanges, their launching dates, and products. 
Exchange 
Date of 
launch Products 
Nord Pool 11.2.2005 
Futures, maturity: 
Dec 2005-2007 
EEX 9.3.2005 Spot 
ECX 22.4.2005 
Futures, maturities: 
Mar/Jun/Sep/Dec 2005-
2007 
Mar/Dec 2008 
Dec 2009-2012 
Climex Alliance 22.6.2005 Spot 
Powernext 24.6.2005 Spot 
EXAA 28.6.2005 Spot 
KBB  27.12.2005 Spot 
 
 
Before the opening of the ETS, only forward contracts intermediated by brokers could 
be bought and sold. In February 2005, Nord Pool started to offer standardized futures 
contracts. EEX was the first to offer spot trade a month later. The forward trade is still 
dominating as brokers trade about 60-80% of all EUAs. Of exchange-traded contracts, 
futures constitute 95% and spot trade 5%. This can be concluded from the fact that ECX 
and Nord Pool offer only futures trade and the other exchanges only spot trading. 
 
The traders in exchanges are large companies, brokers, banks and investment funds. The 
role of speculants is significant; they trade about 50-60% of all transactions (Ruokonen 
2006). Smaller companies have access to exchanges with the intermediation of brokers, 
                                                 
5 An option is an agreement that gives the holder the possibility to sell (put option) or buy (call option) an 
underlying asset the expiration date at the so-called strike price. The price of an option is the option price 
or the option premium. 
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banks and investment funds. The most active market participants have been power 
companies. The reason is that they were allocated a large share of allowances and they 
also already had expertise in trading (Capoor & Ambrosi 2006, 14). At first, the 
participation of installations from the EU10 countries was restricted by nonfunctionning 
registries and hesitation, but since then they have entered the markets more actively. 
 
The growing number of trade products and market participants contribute to 
informational efficiency. A large variety of products assures that traders can realize 
their plans as they wish and hedge against the future or speculate. A large number of 
market participants increases liquidity. The fact that there are eight exchanges is on the 
other hand positive, but causes that the market is decentralized. It is predicted that all 
the exchanges cannot survive.  
 
 
4.2 Price data 
 
This chapter introduces the European Union emission allowance (EUA) price data, 
which is analysed in the following chapter 5. The data consists of daily closing prices of 
a futures contract on EUAs expiring on 19 December 2006 from the European Carbon 
Exchange (ECX). The EUA price data, named as series Pt, is presented in Figure 6. The 
data includes closing prices of trading days during 22 April 2005 - 30 March 2006, 
altogether 240 observations. The 22 April 2005 is the date when ECX started to offer 
EUA futures contracts. All price data is provided by Reuters (2006). The price 
development was described in the previous chapter 4.1. 
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Figure 6. Price series Pt. Closing price during 22 April 2005 - 30 March 2006 of EUA 
futures contract of vintage 2006, from the ECX exchange. (Source: Reuters 2006.) 
 
 
The ECX futures contract for December 2006 is chosen because it is currently the most 
liquid product and it offers continuous data until this date. The vintage 2005 was more 
liquid until the end of 2005, but a long and continuing time series was considered more 
important than the liquidity rate. Volumes of futures expiring in December 2005 and 
2006 are presented in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Volumes of ECX futures contract trades expiring in December 2005 and 2006 
in thousands of EUAs. (For vintage 2005 data is available until 23.11.2005.) (Source: 
Reuters 2006.) 
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In the econometric analysis of this thesis, the EUA price will be studied as a natural 
logarithm series, pt, and a differentiated natural logarithm series, ∆pt, instead of the 
original series, Pt. The natural logarithm is used, because the differentiated natural 
logarithm series expresses changes in the logarithmic series as proportional changes in 
the original series6 (Stock & Watson 2003, 209, 432). The natural logarithm of the EUA 
price is denoted as ).ln( tt Pp =  The difference of the natural logarithm series is denoted 
as .1−−=∆ ttt ppp  The ∆pt series can also be interpreted as logarithmic price returns. 
The differentiation transforms the series into a stationary series, i.e. a series of which 
the probability distribution does not change over time (Stock & Watson 2003, 447). 
Stationarity is required in the autocorrelation coefficient analysis and in forming the 
autoregressive model. The two modifications of the original series, pt and ∆pt, are 
presented in Figures 8 and 9. The natural logarithm series has the same appearance as 
the original series. The differentiated natural logarithm series behaves as a stationary 
series. 
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Figure 8. Natural logarithm price series, pt. 
 
                                                 
6 
t
t
ttt
P
P
PPP
∆
≅−∆+ )ln()ln(  , when 
t
t
P
P∆
 is small (Stock & Watson 2003, 209). 
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Figure 9. Differentiated natural logarithm prices series, ∆pt . 
 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics of series Pt, pt, and ∆pt. 
 
Descriptive 
statistics 
Pt pt ∆pt 
Mean 22.90 3.12 0.00 
Standard Error 0.20 0.01 0.00 
Standard deviation 3.10 0.14 0.03 
Sample variance 9.62 0.02 0.00 
Kurtosis -0.42 -0.10 11.30 
Skewness -0.04 -0.39 -1.82 
Minimum 16.00 2.77 -0.15 
Maximum 29.60 3.39 0.09 
No. of observations 240 240 239 
 
 
The descriptive statistics of the three series are presented in Table 6. The original price 
series, Pt, ranges from 16 to 29.60€, with a mean of 22.9€, variance of 9.62€ and 
standard deviation of 3.10€. The series is symmetric but platykurtic7 because its kurtosis 
is less than 3. The natural logarithm series, pt, is only a transformation of the original 
series and its values have no practical interpretation. It is also platycurtic and nearly 
symmetric. The values range from 2.77 to 3.39, with a mean of 3.12 and standard 
                                                 
7 A variable is platykurtic if it’s kurtosis is less than 3 and it’s probability density function is “flat”. 
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deviation of 0.14. The differentiated logarithmic prices range from -0.15 to 0.09, with 
zero mean and standard deviation of 0.03. This means that changes in the original price 
have ranged from -15% to 9%, the average change being 0%. The series is negatively 
skewed and strongly leptocurtic8 (kurtosis 11.30). 
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Figure 10. Histogram of price series Pt. 
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Figure 11. Histogram of natural logarithm price series pt . 
 
 
                                                 
8 A variable is leptokurtic if it’s kurtosis is more than 3 and it’s probability density function is “peaked”. 
 
 
 39 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
-0
.0
6
-0
.0
5
-0
.0
4
-0
.0
3
-0
.0
2
-0
.0
1 0
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
0.
06
0.
07
M
or
e
 
Figure 12. Histogram of differentiated natural logarithm price series ∆pt . 
 
 
Figures 10, 11, and 12 present histograms of the three series. Series Pt has several peaks: 
a dominating peak at about 23€ and smaller peaks at 28€, 20€, and 17€. The natural 
logarithm series, pt, is similar in shape. The distribution of series ∆pt is smoother with 
only one peak at zero. The series has “fat tails”, which means that it is leptocurtic. The 
fat tail effect might be a sign of volatility clustering. The negative skewness of the 
series is obvious. 
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5 Analysis of informational efficiency 
 
This chapter provides an analysis of informational efficiency of the European Union 
emission allowance (EUA) market. The analysis includes a unit root test, an 
autocorrelation coefficient analysis, a variance ratio test, and a test of price 
predictability. The unit root test is a preliminary test of stationarity. The autocorrelation 
coefficients and the variance ratio are actual random walk tests, which test the RW3 
random walk hypothesis presented in chapter 3.3. The predictability test is added to find 
out if revealed autocorrelation can be used in price prediction. The analysis is carried 
out with the natural logarithm and the differentiated natural logarithm of the EUA price, 
series pt and ∆pt. 
 
 
5.1 Unit root test 
 
A unit root test reveals whether a time series that is being analysed is stationary or has a 
stochastic trend. As was mentioned in chapter 3.3, a random walk has a stochastic trend, 
but more precisely, it is a first difference stationary process. Therefore, if the EUA price 
were a random walk, it should have a stochastic trend and the first difference should be 
stationary. 
 
The null and alternative hypotheses of the unit root test are: 
 
ttt ppH εµ ++= −10 :            [5.1] 
( ) ttt tptpH εµφµ +−−=− − )1(: 11  , )1,1(−∈φ         [5.2] 
 
The term µ  denotes drift and term tε  expresses a zero-mean stationary process, to 
which applies that each increment added to the partial sum of increments has a 
significant effect on the partial sum’s variance, 20σ , in other words, the variance 
increases at approximately the same rate as time T: 
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The term φ  is a coefficient of which the value is tested. If the null hypothesis is 
accepted, the series has a stochastic trend and a unit root. In this case, a shock to tp  will 
appear in the expectations of all future values and the shock is said to be permanent. On 
the other hand, the rejection of the null hypothesis and approval of the alternative 
indicates that the series is stationary and does not have a unit root. In this case, a shock 
in tp  is temporary and its effect decreases as the number of lags grows. (Campbell et al. 
1997, 64-65.) 
 
However, the acceptance of the null hypothesis is not sufficient proof of a random walk, 
because the null hypothesis contains also nonrandom walk alternatives. In the null 
hypothesis the increments might be predictable9, which is not allowed in a random walk. 
(Campbell et al. 1997, 65.) The unit root test is nonetheless a useful tool in analysing a 
time series. 
 
The unit root test used here is the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF)10 test. The tested 
series are the natural logarithm and the difference of the natural logarithm of the 
original price. The results of these tests are presented in Table 7. The right number of 
lags is determined with Akaike information criteria (AIC) (see Appendix II for details 
of information criteria). The test requires that the error terms are independent and 
homoskedastic, so a sufficient number of lags must be included. This is why Akaike 
information criteria is more preferable than Bayes criteria (BIC), although both 
information criteria have the tendency to select small lag values (Stock & Watson 2003, 
487-488). 
  
 
                                                 
9 The increments are allowed to be a zero-mean stationary process (Campbell et al. 1997, 65). 
10 ADF uses the regressor ∑
=
−−=
+∆+++
k
i
tititt pptp
1
1 εβφµα , where α  and  µ  are both drift 
terms, k the number of lags 
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Table 7. ADF unit root test results for series pt and ∆pt. 
Variable ADF test 
statistic 
Significance 
level 
Null 
hypothesis 
Lags 
pt 0.9142 over 10% 
not rejected 
(P=0.8186) 5 
 
∆pt -8.2125 under 1% 
rejected 
(P< 0.0019) 2 
 
 
The ADF test statistic is 0.9142 for the natural logarithm series and -8.2125 for the 
differentiated natural logarithm series. In the case of the pt series, the null hypothesis is 
accepted at 82% probability. In the case of the difference of the natural logarithm, the 
null hypothesis is rejected at over 99% probability. Thus, the pt series quite likely does 
contain a unit root and has a stochastic trend. It is clear that the ∆pt series is stationary. 
As a conclusion, it seems that the EUA series is a first difference stationary process, 
which implies that it might be a random walk. 
 
 
5.2 Random walk tests 
 
In this chapter, the EUA price series is tested against the criteria of RW3, the most 
general form of random walk hypotheses. The random walk tests include studies of 
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients and variance ratios. According to 
the RW3 hypothesis, the autocorrelation coefficients of the first difference series should 
be zero and variance should grow linearly with time (Campbell et al. 1997, 44, 48). The 
tests reveal, whether this is true or not in the case of the EUA price. The autocorrelation 
coefficients and partial autocorrelation coefficients are studied for both the natural 
logarithm and the difference of the natural logarithm of the EUA series. The variance 
ratio test is carried out with the differentiated natural logarithm series.  
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Autocorrelation coefficients 
 
Autocorrelation (AC) of a series Y at lag k expresses correlation between lags Yt and Yt-k. 
The kth autocorrelation coefficient is: 
 
)var()var(
)cov(
ktt
ktt
k
YY
YY
−
−
−
=ρ .          [5.4] 
 
The kth autocorrelation coefficient can be estimated as: 
 
∑
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where Y  is the sample mean of Y and T is the number of observations. (Stock & 
Watson 2003, 435; Eviews 5 user’s guide 2004, 314-315.) If the kth coefficient is 
nonzero, there is kth order serial correlation. Serial autocorrelation can be captured by an 
autoregressive (AR) model, which represents Yt as a linear function of its lagged values. 
The regressors of a pth order autoregressive model are 1−tY , 2−tY  …, ptY − . If the values of 
the autocorrelation coefficients die out geometrically as k increases, the series follows a 
low-order autoregressive process. If the values drop soon to zero as k increases, the 
series follows a low-order moving-average (MA) process, in which Yt is modelled with 
recent values of white noise error terms. (Stock & Watson 2003, 441; Eviews 5 user’s 
guide 2004, 314-315; Hamilton 1994, 48.) 
 
Partial autocorrelation (PAC) at lag k expresses correlation of the values of series Y at k 
periods apart, ignoring the correlation from the intervening lags. The kth partial 
autocorrelation coefficient is the regression coefficient on ktY − , when Yt is regressed on 
a constant, 1−tY , …, ktY − . The PAC coefficient, kφ , can be estimated as: 
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where kρ  is an estimation of the kth order autocorrelation and jkkkjkjk −−− −= ,1,1, φφφφ . If 
the series is a pure pth order autoregressive process, the partial autocorrelation 
coefficients cut off at lag p. In the case of a pure moving average process, the partial 
autocorrelation dies out gradually to zero. (Eviews 5 user’s guide 2004, 315-316.) 
 
Figure 13 and Table 8 present autocorrelation coefficients (AC) and partial 
autocorrelation coefficients (PAC) of the logarithmic series, pt, and the differentiated 
logarithmic series, ∆pt. Table 8 shows also the Ljung-Box Q-statistic and its p-value. 
The Q-statistic tests the null hypothesis that there is no autocorrelation up to order k. It 
is distributed according to a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of autocorrelations. (See Appendix III for details.) In Figure 13, the coefficients 
are shown along with bounds indicating difference from zero at 95% probability 
(EViews 5 user’s guide 2004, 315). 
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    pt      ∆pt   
Figure 13. Autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation of series pt and ∆pt with 95% 
probability bounds. 
 
 
Table 8. Autocorrelation (AC) and partial autocorrelation (PAC) coefficients, and 
Ljung Box Q-statistics with p-values of series pt and ∆pt. 
  pt ∆pt 
Lag (k) AC PAC Q p AC PAC Q p 
1 0.97 0.97 233.62 0 0.25 0.25 15.37 0.000 
2 0.94 -0.12 451.33 0 -0.05 -0.12 15.88 0.000 
3 0.90 0.00 653.84 0 0.01 0.06 15.90 0.001 
4 0.86 -0.07 840.32 0 0.13 0.12 20.13 0.000 
5 0.82 -0.12 1008.80 0 -0.03 -0.10 20.32 0.001 
6 0.78 0.03 1160.90 0 0.03 0.09 20.54 0.002 
7 0.73 -0.07 1296.60 0 0.02 -0.03 20.65 0.004 
8 0.69 -0.03 1416.50 0 -0.09 -0.11 22.48 0.004 
9 0.64 0.03 1522.30 0 -0.03 0.05 22.70 0.007 
10 0.60 0.00 1615.60 0 0.07 0.04 24.08 0.007 
11 0.56 -0.06 1696.40 0 0.01 -0.02 24.12 0.012 
12 0.52 -0.02 1765.80 0 -0.17 -0.14 31.32 0.002 
13 0.48 0.06 1825.80 0 -0.10 -0.04 34.06 0.001 
14 0.45 -0.01 1877.70 0 -0.05 -0.05 34.74 0.002 
15 0.41 0.01 1922.40 0 -0.03 -0.01 35.03 0.002 
16 0.38 -0.02 1960.50 0 -0.09 -0.06 37.04 0.002 
17 0.35 0.01 1993.20 0 -0.03 0.00 37.26 0.003 
18 0.32 0.01 2021.20 0 -0.08 -0.06 38.84 0.003 
19 0.30 0.01 2045.30 0 0.00 0.05 38.84 0.005 
20 0.28 -0.01 2066.00 0 -0.02 -0.06 38.93 0.007 
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The series pt has strong positive autocorrelation. The first order autocorrelation is 0.97. 
The autocorrelation coefficients decrease gradually as k increases. Partial 
autocorrelation is significant at a 5% significance level only at the first lag. The Ljung-
Box Q-statistic and its p-values indicate that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is 
rejected at all lags. These results are typical for an economic nonstationary level series. 
 
The series ∆pt has positive first order autocorrelation. The series does not include 
significant (at 5% significance level) autocorrelation at other lags. The first 
autocorrelation coeffificient is 0.25, which means that the lagged change in the 
logarithmic price explains the current change. According to the Ljung-Box Q-statistic 
and its small p-values (0-0.7%), the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation is rejected at 
all lags. These results imply that the series ∆pt follows an autoregressive (AR1) process, 
but this remains to be confirmed. 
 
As a conclusion, the series pt and ∆pt both have significant autocorrelation and do not 
fulfill the requirements of a random walk. This does not come as a surprise for the level 
series pt, but the stationary ∆pt could have been nonautocorrelated. The results raise the 
question, if the serial correlation can be used to predict future prices. This issue is 
studied in chapter 5.3. 
 
 
Variance ratios 
 
According to the random walk hypotheses, the variance of a random walk’s increments 
is a linear function of time. The variance ratio (VR) shows if this requirement holds. 
The variance ratio is calculated for the difference of the natural logarithm series, tp∆ . In 
the two period case, the variance of the series today should be twice the variance of the 
series yesterday, i.e. the variance of 1−∆+∆ tt pp  should be twice the variance of tp∆ . To 
compare the variance of longer intervals, a term q is introduced to express the interval in 
trading days. Thus, when q is e.x. 6, the weekly development of the variance is 
examined by comparing the series tp∆  to the series until .5−∆ tp  Mathematically: 
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where )(kρ  is the kth order autocorrelation coefficient of tp∆ . The variance ratio should 
be statistically indistinguishable from one in the case of a random walk. (Campbell et al. 
1997, 48-49.) 
 
A standardized test statistic, ψ(q), tests the null hypothesis of RW3, which requires 
uncorrelated increments of a process. The null hypothesis allows general forms of 
heteroskedasticity. Under the null hypothesis, the variance ratio approaches one for all q 
as the number of observations increases. The test statistic is presented in detail in 
Appedix IV. (Campbell et al. 1997, 53-55.) 
 
 
Table 9. Variance ratios, test statistics, and significance levels for series tp∆ . 
q VR(q) Ψ(q)  Sig. 
2 1.2562 4.0100 over 0.0005 
3 1.3211 3.3714 over 0.0027 
4 1.3623 3.0312 over 0.0027 
5 1.4425 3.1611 over 0.0027 
6 1.4940 3.1280 over 0.0027 
7 1.5425 3.1154 over 0.0027 
8 1.5875 3.1087 over 0.0027 
9 1.6056 2.9868 0.0028 
10 1.6185 2.8673 0.0040 
11 1.6461 2.8347 0.0046 
12 1.6745 2.8160 0.0048 
13 1.6727 2.6844 0.0074 
14 1.6562 2.5122 0.0120 
15 1.6358 2.3429 0.0192 
 
 
Table 9 presents the variance ratios (VR(q)), the test statistics (ψ(q)), and the 
significance levels at intervals from 2 to 15 trading days. When q is 2, the variance ratio 
is about 1.26. As q increases, the variance ratio grows until q=12, after which it starts to 
decrease. The results are nearly all significant at a 1% significance level. Only when q 
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gets values 14 and 15, the significance level increases to 2%. The null hypothesis is 
accepted at all levels of q with at least 98.08% probability, and at q=2 with over 99.95% 
probability. The results imply that the variance of the differentiated logarithmic EUA 
price series grows linearly with time just like a random walk should. The previous 
analysis of serial correlation, on the contrary, provides cogent evidence that the tp∆  
series is a nonrandom walk. The revealed autocorrelation prevents the series from 
fulfilling the econometric requirements of a random walk. The next task is to find out 
whether the autocorrelation may be used to predict future prices or can the market still 
be considered informationally efficient. 
 
 
5.3 Predictability 
 
In an informationally efficient market, it is impossible to make extra profits by 
forecasting from historical price data. The predictability of the EUA markets is judged 
by the R-squared of the best possible price forecasting model, which captures serial 
correlation. The model is chosen on the grounds of autocorrelation, partial 
autocorrelation, significance of coefficients and Bayes information criterion (BIC). The 
minimized BIC indicates the right number of lags to include to the model (see Appendix 
II). The studied series is the differentiated logarithmic series, tp∆ , for its stationarity. 
 
The autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients, presented in chapter 5.2, 
suggest an autoregressive moving average ARMA(1,1) model, but a more precise study 
shows that this is not the case. Table 10 presents the relevant properties of the 
considered AR(1), AR(2), and ARMA(1,1) models. The properties include the Bayes 
information criterion, R-squared, adjusted R-squared, variable coefficients, and T-
statistics. As can be seen, the ARMA(1,1) model coefficients are not significant, 
because the T-statistics are only -0.1634 and 1.5458. The second lag of the AR(2) 
model is not significant either (T-statistic -2.5593). The coefficient of the AR(1) model 
regressor, on the other hand, is significant (T-statistic is 4.6980). The smallest value of 
BIC (-4.5321) also supports the AR(1) model. The eventual model choice is therefore 
the first order autoregressive model. 
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Table 10. Model comparison: Bayes information criteria (BIC), R-squared, adjusted R-
squared, variable coefficients and T-statistics. 
Model BIC R
2
 Adj. R
2 
Variable Coefficient T-statistic 
C 0.0018 0.8645 
AR(1) -4.5321 0.0627 0.0588 
AR(1) 0.2494 4.6980 
C 0.0020 0.9993 
AR(1) 0.2851 5.0960 AR(2) -4.5267 0.0785 0.0708 
AR(2) -0.1164 -2.5593 
C 0.0018 0.9067 
AR(1) -0.0358 -0.1634 ARMA(1,1) -4.5237 0.0758 0.0681 
MA(1) 0.3196 1.5458 
 
 
The R-squared of the AR(1) model is 0.0627 and the adjusted R-squared 0.0588. This 
means that only a marginal proportion, about 6.3%, of the price change is explained by 
historical price data. Thus, the price can be predicted only to a very small extent. 
According to Campbell et al. (1997, 80), financial asset returns are often predictable to 
some degree. Malkiel (2003, 62) emphasizes the difference between statistical and 
economical significance in findings of autocorrelation. In his opinion, the most 
important aspect of informational efficiency is that market participants cannot 
continuously make a revenue that is above average. If these momentums occur in 
financial markets, they are offset by transaction costs, or arbitraged away as soon as 
they become public. (Malkiel 2003, 62-63.) 
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                  Residuals              Squared residuals 
Figure 14. Correlograms of residuals and squared residuals. 
 
 
Table 11. Correlograms and Ljung Box Q-statistics with p-values of residuals and 
squared residuals. 
Residuals Squared residuals  
k AC PAC Q p AC  PAC  Q p 
1 0.04 0.04 0.31 - 0.10 0.10 2.46 - 
2 -0.11 -0.11 3.39 0.07 -0.01 -0.02 2.50 0.114 
3 -0.01 0.00 3.41 0.18 0.03 0.03 2.69 0.261 
4 0.15 0.14 8.72 0.03 0.43 0.43 48.26 0 
5 -0.07 -0.08 9.93 0.04 0.07 -0.01 49.60 0 
6 0.04 0.08 10.26 0.07 -0.02 -0.01 49.68 0 
7 0.04 0.02 10.64 0.10 0.02 0.02 49.74 0 
8 -0.10 -0.12 13.17 0.07 0.13 -0.07 54.12 0 
9 -0.03 0.02 13.37 0.10 0.06 0.04 55.12 0 
10 0.08 0.05 15.18 0.09 0.00 0.01 55.12 0 
11 0.04 0.02 15.54 0.11 0.03 0.02 55.33 0 
12 -0.16 -0.13 22.33 0.02 0.16 0.15 61.73 0 
13 -0.06 -0.05 23.18 0.03 0.01 -0.07 61.74 0 
14 -0.02 -0.06 23.30 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 61.99 0 
15 0.00 -0.01 23.30 0.06 -0.04 -0.06 62.32 0 
16 -0.09 -0.07 25.26 0.05 -0.02 -0.18 62.46 0 
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The accuracy of the model is assessed by examining the autocorrelation (AC) and 
partial autocorrelation (PAC) coefficients of residuals and squared residuals. If the 
residuals and squared residuals are autocorrelated, the model does not take account of 
all predictable factors. The AC and PAC coefficients are presented in Figure 14, with 
95% probability bounds, and numerically along with the Ljung-Box Q-statistic and its 
p-value in Table 11. The AC and PAC coefficients of residuals are insignificant at a 5% 
significance level. The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation cannot be rejected with 
certainty, for the p-values of the Ljung-Box Q-statistic are only 0.03-0.18. The squared 
residuals, however, contain strong serial correlation at the fourth lag. At the fourth lag, 
the p-value drops to zero. 
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Figure 15. Residuals of AR(1) model of differentiated logarithmic EUA series.  
 
 
The autocorrelation of residuals and squared residuals refers to time-varying 
heteroskedasticity, in other words, volatility clustering. Figure 15 presents the residuals 
of the AR(1) model. The figure shows that at times the absolute forecast errors of the 
model are less than two percent units, but at times they are way above. The residuals 
express time-varying heteroskedasticity. The volatility clustering could be modelled by 
adding an autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) or generalized ARCH 
(GARCH) part to the autoregressive model. In the ARCH model, the error term’s 
variance depends on its past squared values. In the GARCH model, the variance 
depends also on its own lagged values. (Stock & Watson 2003, 562-563.) 
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6 Conclusions 
 
The aim of this thesis was to examine the European Union emission allowance markets 
from an informational efficiency point of view. The issues in focus were if the market 
price reflects all relevant information and if it reacts fast to new information. In an 
informationally efficient market, future prices are unpredictable, although price 
formation principles are known to all market participants. The unpredictability is due to 
randomly arriving new information. In consequence, it is impossible for anyone to make 
continuously above average profits in the market. The informational efficiency theory is 
tested with econometric analyses. The analyses rely on the weak informational 
efficiency hypothesis, which requires that prices reflect all information contained in 
historical prices. The econometric conditions are defined by a general random walk 
hypothesis RW3.  
 
The results of the random walk analysis, the autocorrelation coefficients and the 
variance ratio test, show that the EUA price series does not fulfil the requirements of a 
random walk. The variance increases linearly, but there is serial correlation present in 
the time series. However, from the perspective of informational efficiency, the random 
walk criterion might not be necessary. To prove that the EUA markets are efficient, it 
suffices that the price development is unpredictable. The best possible autoregressive 
model has an R-squared of 6.3%. The econometric conclusion of the results is that there 
is significant autocorrelation present and the markets are not informationally efficient. 
However, in practice it seems impossible to make economic profit of historical price 
data. It is important to distinguish this economic aspect from the econometric one. The 
results are similar to other financial market analyses. Financial asset returns are often 
predictable to some extent, but predictability can rarely be used to constantly beat the 
market. At least, the momentums disappear in the long run. Transaction costs may be a 
reason why all arbitrage opportunities are not taken advantage of. (Campbell et al. 1997, 
80; Malkiel 2003, 61-62). The conclusion is that the EUA market may still be efficient 
in spite of the predictability. 
  
The predictability analysis could be extended by adding the possibility of volatility 
clustering to the autoregressive model. The 30-day rolling volatility presented in Figure 
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in chapter 4.1 as well as the residuals reported in Figure 15 in chapter 5.3 suggest that 
volatility clustering is present. An autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) 
model or generalized ARCH model would produce more accurate results. 
 
The analysis was carried out with daily closing prices. It is possible that weakly data 
would be a better choice. The daily prices may be affected by factors that increase 
heteroskedasticity. It is also possible that many market participants change their 
position more seldom than would be reasonable due to trading costs. For these reasons 
weakly data is worth examining, as well as monthly data when enough observations are 
available. According to initial econometric study, weakly EUA data contains less 
autocorrelation than the daily data. 
 
It could be fruitful to analyze informational efficiency of the EUA market also with 
event studies or tests for private information. With event studies, it would be possible to 
examine price reactions to the announcement of new information and draw conclusions 
about the rapidity of the reactions and market participants’ understanding of price 
formation. Tests for private information would reveal if some market participants that 
have access to special information can make extra profits in the long run.  
 
As time goes by and the EUA markets mature, informational efficiency is bound to 
develop further. The markets will see more participants, larger volumes, and better 
understanding of emissions trading and the ETS. The strengthening of the political 
framework and regulation would advance efficiency by decreasing uncertainty and 
clarifying the principals of price formation. 
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Appendix 
 
 
I. Volatility  
 
Volatility is attained by calculating the standard deviation of logarithmic price returns, 
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r  and multiplying the standard deviation by the correct factor, which in the 
case of stock prices traded five days a week is 250 . This is expressed as a single 
equation: 
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where n is the number of observations, rt the logarithmic price return and r  the mean of 
logarithmic price returns. (Clewlow & Strickland 2000, 40; Hull 2000, 242.) 
 
 
II. Akaike and Bayes information criteria 
 
The right number of lags in a unit root test or an autoregressive model can be estimated 
by minimizing the Akaike or Bayes information criteria. The Akaike is prefferred in the 
case of unit root tests, the Bayes in the case of an autoregressive model. The Akaike 
information criteria (AIC) is the following: 
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where p is the number of lags, tεˆ  are the ordinary least squares residuals, and n the 
number of observations. The Bayes information criteria is very similar:  
 
n
T
p
T
pBIC
n
t
t
ln
)1(
ˆ
ln)( 1
2
++












=
∑
=
ε
         [A3] 
 
(Stock & Watson 2003, 453-455, 487.) 
 
 
III. Ljung Box Q-statistic 
 
The Ljung Box Q-statistic at lag k is calculated by: 
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,               [A4] 
 
where n is the number of observations, and 2jρ  the jth autocorrelation coefficient. The 
Q-statistic is distributed as a chi-squared with degrees of freedom equal to the number 
of autocorrelations. (EViews 5 user’s guide quide 2004, 316.) 
 
 
IV. Variance ratio test 
 
The standardized test statistic, )(qψ , for null hypothesis RW3, in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity is: 
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where nq denotes the number of observations, θ
)
 is a heteroskedasticity-consistent 
estimator of )(qθ , the asymptotic variance of )(qRV : 
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where kδ
)
 , on the other hand, is a heteroskedasticity-consistent estimator of kδ , the 
asymptotic variance of )(kρ) : 
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(Campbell et al. 1997, 49-55.) 
 
